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Contracts of the Dead and 
Boilerplate 
William A. Drennan† 
Abstract 
Black’s Law Dictionary defined “boilerplate” as language with “a 
definite meaning in the same context without variation.”1 If the goal of 
using boilerplate is uniform application,2 it fails spectacularly in the 
murky land of contracts of the dead. Some courts have treated 
boilerplate clauses as reflecting the intent of the parties and decided 
whether contractual obligations survived the death of a party based on 
the boilerplate. Other courts have ignored or otherwise dismissed the 
exact same boilerplate. This Article argues that the latter approach is 
usually preferable. Death talk is a social taboo, so parties rarely address 
it directly in written contracts. When they employ standard boilerplate 
clauses, it seems doubtful that they intend it to address death before 




I.  Inevitable Disputes, Judicial Presumptions, and the 
Primacy of Intent ................................................................. 606 
II.  Finding a Clear Expression of Intent in the Contract ........ 611 
III.  Ascribed-Intent Approach ...................................................... 612 
IV.  Reported Cases Interpreting Boilerplate at Death ............ 615 
A. Cases Interpreting Boilerplate About Successors and Assigns ............ 615 
B. Cases Interpreting Boilerplate About Binding Legal Representatives, 
Heirs, or Executors ..................................................................... 618  
†  Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law. Member, American 
Law Institute. Partner and Associate, Husch Blackwell Sanders LLP 
(1985–2005). New York University School of Law, LL.M. (Executive) 
(2013); Washington University School of Law, LL.M. in Intellectual 
Property (2003); Washington University School of Law, LL.M. in 
Taxation (1997); St. Louis University School of Law, J.D. (1985). 
Professor Drennan practiced law full-time for twenty years in the areas of 
tax, estate planning, and business law. Special thanks to Jennifer Davies, 
Class of 2018, Ashley Moya, Class of 2018, Cody Walls, Class of 2019, 
and Amanda Reiter, J.D., for their excellent editorial and research 
assistance. 
1. Boilerplate, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). 
2. Jeremiah T. Reynolds, Barristers Tips, Defending Boilerplate in 
Contracts, 31 L.A. Law. 8, 10 (2008) (praising boilerplate because it 
provides uniformity). 
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“[I]t may be doubtful if the parties [to this contract] ever put their 
minds to the question of ‘suppose [you] die.’”3 
Introduction 
An ad man’s contract said it was binding on his successors and his 
assigns.4 But upon his death, a court said his estate could not perform 
the balance of the advertising contract either as a successor or as an 
assign,5 and the surviving party did not have to accept performance 
from the estate. 
A sharecropper’s contract included a no-assignment clause.6 
Nevertheless, upon the sharecropper’s death, a court concluded his 
estate must farm the land and complete the contract.7 
A music director’s one-year employment contract with a singing 
icon provided for a $25,000 “guaranteed” salary.8 When the singing icon 
died mid-year, a court concluded, despite the “unqualified character of 
the promissory words,”9 the music director was not entitled to the 
$13,100 unpaid balance.10 
In several cases, the contract provided it would bind the parties, 
their heirs, executors, and administrators. Sometimes the courts said 
the deceased party’s estate or other successor must perform the  
3. Ulmann v. Sunset-McKee Co., 221 F.2d 128, 133 (9th Cir. 1955). 
4. Smith v. Zuckman, 282 N.W. 269, 270 (Minn. 1938). 
5. Id. at 271 (“Nor do we think [the estate’s] argument that the 
contract . . . bears upon its face an intent to bind the ‘successors and 
assigns’ of the parties is of any moment.”). 
6. In re Estate of Sauder, 156 P.3d 1204, 1215 (Kan. 2007) (“Paragraph 4(d) 
of the agreement provided that the tenant would ‘not assign this lease or 
sublet the premises.’”). 
7. Id. at 1214. 
8. Farnon v. Cole, 259 Cal. App. 2d 855, 856–57, 860 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1968) (involving Nat King Cole and “any corporation or company for 
whom [Cole] may render services”); see infra notes 52–58 and 
accompanying text (providing additional information about the Farnon 
case). 
9. Farnon, 259 Cal. App. 2d at 858. 
10. Id. at 857–59. 
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remaining contract obligations,11 and sometimes the courts reached the 
opposite result.12 
Why the inconsistencies? Courts generally seek to enforce the intent 
of the parties.13 Contracts of the dead frequently present a challenging 
question—did the parties intend to specify the consequences of death 
when employing certain standard boilerplate clauses?14 
This Article suggests guidelines and considerations for unearthing 
intent post-mortem and marshals the existing authorities that support, 
or dispute, these positions. Part I briefly discusses the taboo of death 
talk, the need to determine intent in these cases, and the presumptions 
courts sometimes fall back on in the absence of intent evidence. 
Part II discusses contracts that clearly reveal an intent about death 
and suggests that courts should give great weight to any written 
contract language which specifically addresses post-death performance. 
Because parties seldom negotiate, draft, and include such direct 
clauses,15 probably due to social taboos about death talk, courts should 
 
11. See, e.g., Warner v. Kaplan, 892 N.Y.S.2d 311, 313 (N.Y. App. 2009); 
Ames v. Sayler, 642 N.E.2d 1340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); see also infra notes 
129–153 and accompanying text (discussing these and similar cases in 
more detail). 
12. See, e.g., Browne v. Fairhall, 100 N.E. 556 (Mass. 1913); Marvel v. 
Phillips, 38 N.E. 1117, 1118 (Mass. 1894); see also infra notes 99–128 and 
accompanying text (discussing these and similar cases in more detail). 
13. Charles L. Knapp et al., Problems in Contract Law: Cases and 
Materials 384 (8th ed. 2016) (asserting that when interpreting a 
contract “the mutual understanding of the parties controls”); Warnecke 
v. Rabenau’s Estate, 367 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963) (“The 
cardinal rule of construction of contracts and conveyances, of course, [is] 
that the intention of the parties must be ascertained and given effect.”); 
Ress v. Barent, 548 A.2d 1259, 1262 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (“It is a 
cardinal rule of contract interpretation that the intention of the parties 
at the time the contract is entered into governs.”). 
14. In dealing with a contract of the dead, one court stated: “[T]he intention 
and understanding of the parties are not subject to any fixed standard of 
‘weights and measures.’ They are invisible and intangible things variable 
with time and place, and undeterminable by any constant or set formula.” 
Burch v. J. D. Bush & Co., 106 S.E. 489, 490 (N.C. 1921); see also 
Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Page on the Law of Wills § 1.1, at 1 
(2003) (“One cannot read a dead man’s mind.”). Even when both parties 
are alive, courts are not always sure how to determine intent. See Knapp 
et al., supra note 13, at 1059 (citing Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party 
Beneficiaries, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1358, 1378–84 (1992)). 
15. Ulmann v. Sunset-McKee Co., 221 F.2d 128, 133 (9th Cir. 1955) (“The 
use of words of survivorship generally has gone out of fashion in ordinary 
contracts.”). 
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carefully analyze a written contract for clues that the parties implied 
that the arrangement should die (or survive) upon a party’s death.16 
Part III recommends that courts consider an ascribed-intent 
approach reflected in a handful of reported cases. This approach allows 
a court to analyze all relevant facts and circumstances and decide the 
case based on what reasonable parties would have intended in the 
situation. 
Part IV considers common boilerplate clauses with language that 
arguably addresses death when there is no additional evidence about 
intent. Although explicit clauses addressing death are rare, boilerplate 
provisions that arguably address death abound. In some reported cases, 
courts interpret and rely upon the boilerplate to conclude whether the 
contractual obligations survive death. In other reported cases, courts 
are skeptical that standard boilerplate reflects the parties’ intent about 
death and decide whether any remaining contractual obligations vanish 
at death without regard for the boilerplate language. 
Part V surveys the meaning of certain common boilerplate clauses 
in isolation. Part V also considers policy concerns surrounding contracts 
of the dead and discusses options for interpreting boilerplate clauses 
that can allow courts to reach reasonable results. 
The taboo of death talk justifies skepticism toward boilerplate in 
the murky land of contracts of the dead. In the absence of direct 
evidence of negotiations and agreements about death, courts should be 
inclined to terminate many contracts at death. 
I. Inevitable Disputes, Judicial Presumptions, and the 
Primacy of Intent 
Whenever a mortal makes an executory contract, death could 
precede performance.17 “[C]ontracts must be read in the light of the 
knowledge of all mankind, that death may come tomorrow.”18 Although 
 
16. See, e.g., Buccini v. Paterno Constr. Co., 170 N.E. 910, 911 (N.Y. App. 
1930). For a discussion of the case, see infra notes 48–51 and 
accompanying text. 
17. “[T]he only things of which we can be certain are death and taxes.” Lehigh 
Cement Co. v. Quinn, 173 A.3d 1272, 1273 (R.I. 2017); see also Chris 
Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1115, 1115 (2003) (“The corollary . . . is that life is rife with 
uncertainty.”). Justice Holmes wrote: “One who makes a contract never 
can be absolutely certain that he will be able to perform it when the time 
comes.” Day v. United States, 245 U.S. 159, 161 (1917), quoted in Burka 
v. Patrick, 366 A.2d 1070, 1073 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976); see also Cent. 
Contra Costa Sanitary Dist. v. Nat’l Sur. Corp., 246 P.2d 150, 152 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (“The execution of the . . . contract . . . was 
prevented by an irresistible, superhuman cause, namely . . . death.”). 
18. Burka, 366 A.2d at 1073 (quoting Rishel v. Pacific Mut., 78 F.2d 881, 883 
(10th Cir. 1935)). 
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death is always foreseeable,19 the Ninth Circuit has observed that, at 
the time of contracting, parties seldom directly address the impact 
death should have on contract performance.20 This reflects society’s 
aversion to talking about death. There may be no more disfavored 
conversation topic than your own death,21 and some believe discussing 
death will hasten it.22 Form books do not routinely provide sample 
boilerplate provisions directly addressing death.23 
As a practical matter, except when a party is known to be seriously 
ill, or particularly old, raising the topic in contract negotiations seems 
almost unthinkable.24 If you propose contingencies based on the other 
party’s death, are you hinting that their time is short? Or to use a 
euphemism, perhaps you are advising your fellow contract party: 
“Don’t buy green bananas.”25 Also, what signals are you sending to the 
other side if you start speculating about your own death? Will the other 
 
19. Hollis v. Gallagher, 2012 WL 3793288 (Tex. App. 2012) (acknowledging 
that a party was aware of his own mortality); Shutt v. Butner, 303 S.E.2d 
399, 401 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (“[A]ll know that unexpected and untimely 
death is a constant possibility and are deemed to make their contracts in 
light thereof.”). 
20. Ulmann v. Sunset-McKee Co., 221 F.2d 128, 133 (9th Cir. 1955). 
21. See Christie M. Charles, Book Note, 8 B.U. Pub. Int. L. J. 585, 588 
(1998) (reviewing Louise Harmon, Fragments on the Deathwatch 
(1998)) (“[T]he predominant attitude toward death is one of fear; people 
rarely talk about death even in the abstract, and almost never talk about 
their own death. Death therefore evolved into a taboo.”); Walter 
Wadlington, Breaking the Silence of Doctor and Patient, 93 Yale L. J. 
1640, 1650 (1984) (reviewing Jay Katz, The Silent World of 
Doctor and Patient (1984)) (“[D]eath seems to be the most taboo of 
subjects.”). 
22. Gerry W. Beyer, Teaching Materials on Estate Planning 7 (4th 
ed. 2012); Rikk Larsen & Crystal Thorpe, Elder Mediation: Optimizing 
Major Family Transitions, 7 Marq. Elder’s Advisor 293, 299 (2006) 
(“Typical family dynamics in the elder law area could consist 
of: . . . Superstitions. ‘Writing a will could hasten my death.’”). 
23. See, e.g., Tina L. Stark, Negotiating and Drafting Contract 
Boilerplate 90 (2003) (“Drafters should anticipate and directly address 
any issues that could arise upon a party’s death or other life event.”). But 
see Tina L. Stark, Drafting Contracts: How and Why Lawyers 
Do What They Do 215 (2d ed. 2013) (including a standard termination 
provision upon the death of an employee in an employment agreement). 
24. See Akhil Reid Amar, Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Death: Closing 
the Constitution’s Succession Gap, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 215, 215 (1994) 
(“[T]alk about death is bad form.”). 
25. Don’t Buy Green Bananas, Wiktionary (Sept. 1, 2017), https://en. 
wiktionary.org/wiki/don%27t_buy_green_bananas [https://perma.cc/ 
9MAB-GDV3] (“[D]on’t make long-term plans as you may not live/survive 
long enough to accomplish them.”). 
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side want to contract with you if you demonstrate a lack of confidence 
about surviving to fulfill your contractual duties? 
Standard boilerplate clauses have not prevented disputes in this 
area. As demonstrated in Part IV, the law is inconsistent when faced 
with general language about successors and assigns. In addition, some 
courts have even concluded that clauses stating that the contract is 
binding on heirs and executors do not resolve this issue.26 As a result, 
executors and the surviving parties often call upon the courts to decide 
contract survival. 
In the absence of evidence of intent, courts have developed 
presumptions. A presumption is available to allow a court to declare 
that the contract survives death, and this is treated as the general rule. 
Courts applying this presumption have stated: “[D]eath does not 
absolve . . . [contractual] engagements,”27 and “It is a presumption of 
law that the parties to a contract bind not only themselves but their 
personal representatives.”28 On the other hand, a presumption is also 
available to allow a court to declare that contract obligations 
terminated at death, and this is treated as the exception. Courts 
applying this presumption have used the phrase “personal services 
contracts” and have referred to “contracts to whose performance the 
continued existence of a particular person . . . is necessary.”29 Courts 
have stated where the exception applies that “a condition is always 
implied that the death . . . of that person . . . shall excuse 
performance,”30 and that “[n]either party contemplates substitution by 
 
26. See infra notes 99–153, and accompanying text. 
27. Burch v. J. D. Bush & Co., 106 S.E. 489, 490 (N.C. 1921). 
28. United States ex rel. Wilhelm v. Chain, 300 U.S. 31, 35 (1937) (citing 
Estate of Rapp v. Phx. Ins. Co., 113 Ill. 390, 395 (1885)) (including an 
exception for “contracts in which personal skill or taste is required”); see 
First Nat. Bank of Danville v. Taylor, 67 N.E.2d 306, 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1946) (“[G]enerally, at common law, all actions based on contracts survive 
the death of either party.”). 
29. Taylor, 67 N.E.2d at 310.  
30. See, e.g., id. In a bilateral contract, the death of one party who must 
provide personal services may terminate the contract, but the death of a 
party providing non-personal services may not end the contract. See Stark 
v. McCaw, 506 P.2d 863, 866 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (“The contract 
extends beyond the death of McCaw . . . because . . . his performance was 
to be the payment of money.”); Kelley v. Thompson Land Co., 164 S.E. 
667, 668 (W. Va. 1932) (“[T]he promise of a painter to paint a landscape 
is discharged by his physical inability, but the death or illness of one who 
has contracted to buy the painting will not free his estate from liability.”); 
30 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 77:75, at 503 (4th 
ed. 2004) [hereinafter Williston on Contracts] (“[I]t is only the death 
of the party whose pledge is personal that ends the contractual 
arrangement.”) (citations omitted). 
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another.”31 In certain extreme cases, it seems likely that the nature of 
the services signals the parties’ intent. Courts have characterized 
obligations such as agreements “to marry, to draw a picture, write a 
book, perform on the stage, be one’s companion, etc.” as “personal 
services contracts,” which terminate upon the obligor’s death.32 Other 
courts have stated: “All painters do not paint portraits like Sir Joshua 
Reynolds, nor landscapes like Claude Lorraine, nor do all writers write 
dramas like Shakespeare or fiction like Dickens. Rare genius and 
extraordinary skill are not transferable, and contracts for their 
employment are therefore personal, and cannot be assigned.”33 
These presumptions, which date back to Shakespearean England,34 
could be summarized as simply––all contracts survive death except 
personal services contracts.35 Part V asserts that these presumptions 
are outdated. A couple cases, however, suggest that these presumptions 
are paramount in deciding contract survival. For example, a 
Pennsylvania court declared, “[a]ll contracts must be construed with 
reference to their subject matter.”36 A Missouri court asserted that 
 
31. In re Estate of Sheppard, 789 N.W.2d 616, 619 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010); see 
also id. at 618 (quoting Personal Service, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th 
ed. 2004)) (“Personal services are defined as ‘economic service[s] involving 
either the intellectual or manual personal effort of an individual.’”). In 
personal services contracts, “distinctly personal considerations are at the 
foundation of the contract.” Id. (quoting Volk v. Stowell, 74 N.W. 118, 
120 (Wis. 1898)). 
32. Shutt v. Butner, 303 S.E.2d 399, 402 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983). Other 
contracts for purely personal acts include the “agreement of an author to 
write a particular book . . . [or] a sculptor to produce a designated 
statue.” Mackay v. Clark Rig Bldg. Co., 42 P.2d 341, 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1935); Cox v. Martin, 21 So. 611, 612 (Miss. 1897) (including teachers 
who instruct pupils and “masters [who] teach apprentices a trade or 
calling”). 
33. DuPont v. Yellow Cab Co. of Birmingham, Inc., 565 So.2d 190, 193 (Ala. 
1990) (quoting Taylor v. Cyrus Palmer, 31 Cal. 240, 247 (Cal. 1866)); see 
Macke Co. v. Pizza of Gathersburg, Inc., 270 A.2d 645, 648 (Md. 1970). 
In contrast, “rare genius and extraordinary skill are not indispensable to 
the workmanlike digging down of a sand hill or the filling up [of] a 
depression to a given level, or the construction of brick sewers with 
manholes and covers, and contracts for such work are not personal, and 
may be assigned.” Cyrus Palmer, 31 Cal. at 247–48. 
34. See Hyde v. Windsor, 78 Eng. Rep. 798, 798 (Q.B. 1597); see also John 
Edward Murray, Murray on Contracts § 113, at 707 (5th ed. 2011); 
E. Allen Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 9.5, at 626–27 
(3d ed. 2004). 
35. See 14 James P. Nehf, Corbin on Contracts § 75.2, at 127–28 (2001) 
[hereinafter Corbin on Contracts]; Williston on Contracts, supra 
note 30, § 77.75, at 501–02. 
36. Blakely v. Sousa, 47 A. 286, 286 (Pa. 1900). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019 
Contracts of the Dead and Boilerplate 
610 
sometimes obligations are “so purely personal in their nature as to leave 
no room for doubt but that the contract” died with the party’s death.37 
Nevertheless, the majority of cases recognize the primacy of the 
parties’ intent when deciding contract survival.38 For example, in 
Warnecke v. Rabenau’s Estate,39 a tenant entered into a two-year lease 
for office space with the property owner, but the tenant died five 
months into the lease.40 The building owner sued to compel the tenant’s 
estate to pay rent for the balance of the lease term. The court asserted 
the presumption that “a lease for a term of years is not terminated by 
the death of the lessor, or the lessee.”41 Nevertheless, the court stated, 
“if the terms of the lease and the surrounding facts and circumstances 
show that the lease was intended to be only a personal obligation of the 
lessee, then there is necessarily an implied condition that . . . death will 
terminate the lease.”42 The court focused on language in the lease that 
the tenant could only use the space as an office for a certified public 
accountant (CPA),43 and the fact that the decedent’s surviving spouse 
 
37. McDaniel v. Rose, 153 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941). 
38. See, e.g., Ulmann v. Sunset-McKee Co., 221 F.2d 128, 133 (9th Cir. 1955) 
(“[A]lways a court must seek to divine the intent of the parties.”); Schultz 
& Co. v. Johnson’s Admin., 5 B. Mon. 497, 501 (Ky. 1845) (“[E]very case, 
must turn at last upon the intention of the parties.”); Warnecke v. 
Rabenau’s Estate, 367 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963) (“The cardinal 
rule[] of construction of contracts and conveyances, of course, [is] that the 
intention of the parties must be ascertained and given effect.”); Burch v. 
J. D. Bush & Co., 106 S.E. 489, 490 (N.C. 1921) (“[W]hether a given case 
falls under the general rule, or the exception, must depend upon the 
intention of the parties.”); Unit Vending Corp. v. Lacas, 190 A.2d 298, 
300 (Pa. 1963) (“The intention of the parties is paramount.”); Kelley v. 
Thompson Land Co., 164 S.E. 667, 669 (W. Va. 1932); see also In re 
Estate of Sauder, 156 P.3d 1204, 1214 (Kan. 2007) (imploring contract 
drafters to clearly state the parties’ intent about contract survival so the 
courts will not have to work through this legal thicket). The Restatement 
of Contracts suggests an interesting mix of a common law presumption 
with the primacy of intent principle—if the arrangement is a personal 
services contract, then an intent that the contract will survive death will 
only prevail if it is “clearly manifested.” Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 262 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1981); see also Williston on 
Contracts, supra note 30, § 77:70, at 484–85. This approach is 
consistent Marvel v. Phillips, 38 N.E. 1117 (Mass. 1894). See infra notes 
99–106 and accompanying text (discussing Marvel). 
39. Warnecke, 367 S.W.2d at 17. 
40. Id. at 16. 
41. Id. at 17 (citations omitted). 
42. Id. (emphasis added). 
43. Id. at 16. 
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was not a CPA,44 to conclude that the lease “was one of a personal 
nature which terminated with [the tenant’s] death.”45 
II. Finding a Clear Expression of Intent in the 
Contract  
Courts often say the best evidence of the parties’ intent is the 
written language in the contract.46 Although contracts seldom address 
death directly,47 sometimes the contract language will imply the parties’ 
intent that an individual’s survival is a condition precedent to the 
continuing obligation to perform. For example, in Buccini v. Paterno 
Construction Co.,48 Paterno hired Albert Buccini to “decorate the 
ballroom, banquet hall, and swimming pool in a dwelling described as 
‘Paterno’s Castle.’”49 The contract specifically stated that “all the 
decorative figured work shall be done by [Albert] Buccini personally 
and that only the plain work may be delegated to mechanics.”50 Justice 
Cardozo, writing for the majority, concluded that the contract called 
for the artistic skill of Albert Buccini personally on the decorative work, 
and upon Albert’s death, the obligation to perform the decorative work 
terminated.51 
Similarly, in Farnon v. Cole,52 renowned singer Nat King Cole hired 
Brian Farnon as his music director for one year beginning August 31, 
 
44. Id.  
45. Id. at 18. 
46. See, e.g., Southgate Recreation & Park Dist. v. Cal. Ass’n for Park & 
Recreation Ins., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728, 730 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“The 
basic rule of contract interpretation is to effectuate the parties’ intent as 
expressed in the contract’s terms.”); see supra note 13 and accompanying 
text. 
47. See, e.g., Stark v. McCaw, 506 P.2d 863, 864–65 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) 
(demonstrating potential problems if one party tries to deal with death in 
the contract—the other party delayed the negotiation of the death terms, 
the parties agreed to a deal on the other terms, and one party died before 
they negotiated the death terms). 
48. 170 N.E. 910 (N.Y. 1930). 
49. Id. at 911. 
50. Id. 
51. Id.; see also Ctr. Contra Costa Sanitary Dist. v. Nat’l Sur. Corp., 246 
P.2d 150, 154 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (citing In re Estate of Burke, 
244 P. 340, 342 (Cal. 1926)) (explaining that ordinarily a building contract 
is not a personal services contract, but “[i]t is otherwise . . . as remarked 
by Lord Denman [when] the ‘character, credit and substance of the party 
contracted with was an inducement to the contract’”). 
52. 259 Cal. App. 2d 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).  
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1964, at a “guaranteed” salary of $25,000.53 Cole paid Farnon $11,900 
under the contract for the first five months. Cole entered a hospital on 
December 8, 1964, could not publicly perform again, and died of cancer 
on February 15, 1965. Farnon sued Cole’s estate for the balance of 
$13,100 under the “guaranteed” contract. 
The court framed the question as looking at “the intention of the 
parties”54 and found, “[t]he wording of the contract explicitly conveys 
an intent of the parties that the contract be conditioned upon [Nat 
King] Cole’s continued existence and personal participation.”55 Some of 
the contract passages indicating that Farnon would provide services to 
Nat King Cole personally and to no one else included: “I agree to 
employ you, and you agree to render services to me,” “[y]our services 
shall be exclusive to me,” and “[you will serve] as musical director in 
connection with my personal appearances.”56 In addressing the contract 
language that Farnon was “guaranteed”57 $25,000, the court merely 
stated, “it is apparent the parties contracted upon the basis of the 
continued existence of [Nat King Cole].”58 
III. Ascribed-Intent Approach  
In the absence of clear evidence of intent, a handful of cases suggest 
that a court may determine what reasonable, hypothetical parties 
would have intended and may attribute that intent to the actual 
 
53. Id. at 856 n.1; see supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text (discussing 
the Farnon case). 
54. Farnon, 259 Cal. App. at 858. 
55. Id. at 859 (emphasis added). 
56. Id. at 856 n.1. 
57. Id. at 857. 
58. Id. at 858 (quoting Smith v. Preston, 48 N.E. 688, 690 (Ill. 1897)); see 
also Blakely v. Sousa, 47 A. 286, 287 (Pa. 1900) (involving a contract 
between a music director with special business abilities and famous band 
conductor John Philip Sousa; the contract language demonstrated that 
each party entered into the contract because of the special talents of the 
other party). 
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parties.59 For example, in Unit Vending Corp. v. Lacas,60 a cigarette 
vending machine company contracted with the owner of a Philadelphia 
diner “to sell cigarettes . . . in the diner for a continuous period of five 
years.”61 The owner of the diner died just six months into the contract, 
and his family promptly sold the diner. In the sale, the family failed to 
secure a promise from the new owner to honor the cigarette contract.62 
The cigarette vending machine company sued the estate for lost profits. 
The court found nothing in the contract indicating it should end on the 
original owner’s death.63 Also, the court acknowledged this was not a 
personal services contract, so under the common law presumptions the 
contract should have survived the death of the original owner of the 
diner.64 Nevertheless, the court concluded the contract ended on the 
original owner’s death stating that “the court will adopt the 
interpretation which . . . ascribes the most reasonable, probable and 
natural conduct of the parties.”65 
Also, in extreme cases, courts may ascribe intent based on the type 
of services provided. Classic examples of personal services contracts that 
terminate with the obligor’s death include “an agreement of an author 
to write a particular book, an artist to paint a certain painting, [or] a 
 
59. See, e.g., Smith v. Zuckman, 282 N.W. 269, 271 (Minn. 1938) (“[I]t must 
have been intended that the rights should be exercised and the obligations 
performed by him alone.”); Warnecke v. Estate of Rabenau, 367 S.W.2d 
15, 18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963) (concluding that the parties must have 
contemplated that the lease of the office space to the CPA would die with 
the CPA-tenant because “his personal representative could not carry on 
his profession”); Ress v. Barent, 548 A.2d 1259, 1262 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) 
(“[T]he court will adopt the interpretation, which under all the 
circumstances of the case, ascribes the most reasonable, probable, and 
natural conduct of the parties, bearing in mind the objects to be 
accomplished.”). 
60. 190 A.2d 298 (Pa. 1963). 
61. Id. at 299. 
62. Id. at 299–300. The new owner was “agreeable to permit Unit [Vending] 
to continue selling cigarettes through its machines in the diner.” Id. at 
299. But the new owner demanded that he receive all commissions directly 
rather than allowing the commissions to offset a loan to the original 
owner. Unit Vending treated this as a breach of the contract. Id. at 299–
300. 
63. Id. at 300 (“There is nothing in the contract involved saying what should 
happen in the event of the death of Soter. . . . It is significant that it 
failed to provide for performance by the heirs and representatives of his 
estate.”). 
64. Id.; see supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text (discussing the common 
law presumptions). 
65. Lacas, 190 A.2d at 300 (“[A] reasonable interpretation absent specific 
language to the contrary, leads us to the conclusion that it was not 
intended that the contract extend beyond . . . death.”). 
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sculptor to produce a designated statue.”66 At the other extreme, courts 
tend to conclude that the parties intended that the decedent’s estate 
would be obligated to perform when the contract merely requires the 
use of the decedent’s property, such as paying money,67 selling 
property,68 or renting property.69 Between these extremes, however, line 
drawing becomes difficult. The Seventh Circuit stated, “[i]t must be 
admitted that the line of demarcation between the two kinds of 
contracts under consideration [personal services contracts and 
impersonal ones] is not very clearly marked.”70 Courts attempting to 
use the personal services contract presumption cannot even agree on 
whether the issue is a question of fact or law.71 
 
66. Carlock v. La Salle Extension Univ., 185 F.2d 594, 595 (7th Cir. 1950). 
67. Corbin on Contracts, supra note 35, § 75.1, at 122 (“[A]s a general 
matter, a promise to pay money is not made impossible by the death of 
either the debtor or the creditor.”); Brearton v. DeWitt, 170 N.E. 119, 
119–20 (N.Y. 1930) (concerning a health care provider’s agreement to pay 
$1,000 a month for the life of a patient injured by his negligent or reckless 
act); Hutchings v. Bates, 393 S.W.2d 338, 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) 
(concluding that a contractual obligation to pay money does not become 
impossible because of the death of the original debtor). But see Hasemann 
v. Hasemann, 203 N.W.2d 100, 102 (Neb. 1972) (debtor-son’s obligation 
to pay ended upon creditor-father’s death because that is what the parties 
intended). 
68. Shutt v. Butner, 303 S.E.2d 399, 401 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that 
an agreement to sell a home when a child attained age eighteen, which 
was incorporated into a divorce settlement and decree, survived the wife’s 
death); Davis v. Davis, 266 S.W. 797, 799 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). 
69. Wilson v. Fieldgrove, 787 N.W.2d 707, 712 (Neb. 2010) (“[T]he death of 
the landlord or tenant in a year-to-year lease does not terminate the 
lease.”); Estate of Duncan v. Kinsolving, 70 P.3d 1260, 1263 (N.M. 2003) 
(“[Landlords] may enter into leases that extend beyond their death.”); 
Volk v. Stowell, 74 N.W. 118, 118 (Wis. 1898) (involving a five-year 
contract with a farmer to manage and cultivate the farm; upon the death 
of the property owner, the heir could not obtain possession of the farm 
because “[a]n ordinary contract of lease is not such a personal contract as 
is extinguished by the death of the lessor or lessee”). But see Warnecke 
v. Estate of Rabenau, 367 S.W.2d 15, 16–18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963) 
(observing that “[g]enerally . . . a lease for a term of years is not 
terminated by the death of the lessee” but concluding that a two-year 
lease of office space terminated on the death of the tenant when the 
premises could be used only as an “office for certified public accountants 
and for no other purpose,” and decedent’s widow was not an accountant). 
70. Carlock v. La Salle Extension Univ., 185 F.2d 594, 595 (7th Cir. 1950); 
Burch v. J. D. Bush & Co., 106 S.E. 489, 490 (N.C. 1921). 
71. Compare Carlock, 185 F.2d at 595 (“[The contract’s] classification must 
be determined, not as a matter of law, but upon a consideration of all the 
facts and circumstances of the case.”), with In re Estate of Sauder, 156 
P.3d 1204, 1210 (Kan. 2007) (“[W]hether a contract is a personal services 
contract that terminates on the death of a lessee [is a] question[] of law.”), 
and Estate of Duncan, 70 P.3d 1260, 1262 (N.M. 2003) (“[W]hether a 
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IV. Reported Cases Interpreting Boilerplate at Death  
There are two types of boilerplate clauses customarily included in 
contracts that arguably address contract survival after the death of a 
party. First, parties often contract in the name of themselves and their 
“successor and assigns” or provide that the contract will bind their 
“successors and assigns.” Second, parties often include a clause that the 
agreement will be binding on heirs, executors, and administrators. 
Several courts have considered whether a contract should survive death 
because the parties included these miscellaneous clauses. 
A. Cases Interpreting Boilerplate About Successors and Assigns 
In Smith v. Zuckman,72 the Minnesota Supreme Court considered a 
contract between a sole proprietor and his “successors and assigns” on 
one side and a theater owner and his “successors and assigns” on the 
other side.73 The sole proprietor, Al Smith, agreed to use his best efforts 
to obtain advertising to display on the theater screens, and the theater 
owner, Sam Zuckman, agreed to pay compensation and display the 
advertising at the theater.74 Smith died during the two-year term of the 
contract, and his executor and heirs wished to continue providing the 
advertising services and receive compensation under the contract as a 
successor or assign. Zuckman argued that the contract terminated at 
Smith’s death.75 The court applied the rule that the contract “involve[d] 
such a relation of personal confidence that it must have been intended 
that the . . . obligations [be] performed by [Smith] alone . . . [and the 
contract] cannot be assigned without the consent of the other party to 
the original contract.”76 Although acknowledging that the contract 
“bears upon its face an intent to bind the ‘successors and assigns’ of 
the parties,” the court concluded that any argument based on that 
language was not “of any moment.”77 The Minnesota Supreme Court 
relied heavily on two prior Massachusetts cases ignoring boilerplate.78 
The court did not discuss the definition of either “successors” or 
“assigns.” 
 
lease . . . will continue to be enforceable after the death of the 
lessor . . . is a question of law, which we review de novo.”). 
72. 282 N.W. 269 (Minn. 1938).  
73. Id. at 270. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 270–71.  
76. Id. at 271 (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs v. Diebold Safe & Lock Co., 133 U.S. 
473, 488 (1890)). 
77. Id. at 271.  
78. Id. at 271–72 (first citing Browne v. Fairhall, 100 N.E. 556, 557 (Mass. 
1913); then citing Marvel v. Phillips, 38 N.E. 1117, 1118 (Mass. 1894)).  
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Some contracts specifically prohibit assignment. A no-assignment 
clause, in isolation, could suggest that the contract will die with the 
original obligor, and the estate, heirs, and executors will have no duty 
under the contract. In the reported cases, courts reach various results. 
Frederick Stormer entered into a contract with a municipality to 
construct a sewage system.79 Approximately a year-and-a-half later, 
Stormer died when the sewage system was sixty percent complete.80 
Stormer’s executors continued the work, but quit before completion, 
and the municipality sued the estate for breach of contract.81 The 
executors argued that the contract terminated at Fred Stormer’s death 
because it was based on Fred Stormer’s “personal responsibility and 
competency,”82 and also because the contract contained a no-
assignment clause.83  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected both arguments. First, 
the court asserted, “[b]uilding contracts generally do not involve a 
peculiar skill or ability on the part of the person who is to perform 
them, and hence do not terminate on the death of the contractor.”84 
Second, in regards to the boilerplate no-assignment clause, the court 
simply stated the clause “ha[d] no effect on [the] decision,” because “[i]ts 
presence in the contract does not mean that the contract must be 
performed by the decedent and none other.”85 The court did not discuss 
the definition of the word “assignability” but stated the clause “was 
patently inserted to protect the Authority by preventing performance 
by other than qualified contractors.”86 Thus, apparently, the no-
assignment clause prohibited a voluntary assignment to a nonqualified 
contractor but did not prohibit an involuntary transfer to an estate. 
Although there was no discussion of evidence about the intent of the 
particular parties, perhaps this was an equitable result. The decedent’s 
son had been the superintendent on the job during Fred Stormer’s life, 
the decedent’s son initially undertook to complete the contract upon 
Fred Stormer’s death, and later quit,87 perhaps when it became 
uneconomical. 
 
79. In re Estate of Stormer, 123 A.2d 627, 628 (Pa. 1956). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. The executor was Fred Stormer’s son, “who had been superintendent 
of the work during his father’s lifetime.” Id. Fred Stormer died on August 
12, 1953; the son continued the work until October 3, 1953, and other 
executors continued the work until January 21, 1954. Id. 
82. Id. at 629. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 630. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 628. 
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In California Packing Corp. v. Lopez,88 a farm owner was party to 
an “asparagus cropping contract” with a sharecropper which contained 
a no-assignment clause.89 When the sharecropper died, his brother, who 
was the executor of the estate, moved onto the property and began 
farming the land. The land owner sued to evict the brother arguing the 
contract involved personal services and terminated upon the 
sharecropper’s death, and the no-assignment clause prohibited the 
transfer of contract rights to the estate.90 The court disagreed, stating: 
“Contracts for cultivation of the soil are not generally held to be 
contracts terminable upon death,”91 and the no-assignment clause 
“forbids only voluntary assignment . . . [and] is not violated by an 
involuntary assignment by operation of law.”92 On a practical level, the 
court’s choice allowed the family to continue to farm the one hundred 
acres, which may have been a minor inconvenience for the owner that 
had recently purchased five thousand acres.93 
In the complicated case of In re Estate of Sauder,94 the Kansas 
Supreme Court decided a no-assignment clause should be disregarded 
when the same contract stated the agreement will “be binding on heirs, 
successors, executors and administrators.”95 The Kansas district court 
apparently gave effect to the no-assignment clause and found that it 
 
88. 279 P. 664 (Cal. 1929).  
89. Id. at 664–65. The contact provided: “The second party shall have no 
right to assign this agreement or sublet the above described land or any 
part thereof, without the written consent of the [farm owner].” Id. at 665. 
90. Id. at 665. 
91. Id. But see In re Estate of Sauder, 156 P.2d 1204, 1213 (Kan. 2007) 
(asserting that sharecropping arrangements usually are personal services 
contracts and terminate upon the farmer’s death) (citing Read v. Estate 
of Mincks, 176 N.W.2d 192, 193 (Iowa 1970)). 
92. Cal. Packing Corp., 279 P. at 665. 
93. Id. 
94. 156 P.3d 1204 (Kan. 2007). 
95. Id. at 1215. The Sauder case is complicated for several reasons. In 
concluding that the contract survived the sharecropper’s death, the 
Kansas Supreme Court relied first upon a Kansas statute providing: 
“Executors and administrators shall have the same remedies to recover 
rents, and be subject to the same liabilities to pay them, as their testators 
and intestates.” Id. at 1213–14 (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58-2519 
(2017)). The Kansas Supreme Court stated the statute was “simply a 
codification of the common law.” Id. at 1214 (quoting H.W. Hannah, The 
Legal Status of Tenant Farmers in Kansas, 7 Kan. L. Rev. 295, 301 
(1959)). But see In re Estate of Sauder, 156 P.3d at 1213 (asserting that 
“the majority of jurisdictions have noted that considerable skill and 
judgment are required in farming and a landlord’s confidence in the lessee 
is personal and not assignable, transferable, or inheritable”). The court 
then analyzed the language of the contract and concluded that at least 
part of the language “had the same effect as K.S.A. 58-2519.” Id. at 1215. 
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reflected the parties’ intent that the contract terminated upon the 
sharecropper or tenant’s death.96 The Kansas appeals courts disagreed, 
stating that “circumstances surrounding an administrator assuming the 
duties and obligations of a decedent under a contract is not an 
assignment or sublease.”97 The Kansas Supreme Court, rather than 
focusing on the no-assignment clause, cited dictum from an Illinois case, 
stating that language in a contract that the agreement would be binding 
on heirs and executors would cause a contract to survive.98 
B. Cases Interpreting Boilerplate About Binding Legal Representatives, 
Heirs, or Executors 
Several cases conclude that a contract terminates on the death of a 
party notwithstanding a boilerplate clause stating the contract binds 
legal representatives, heirs, executors, and administrators. In Marvel v. 
Phillips,99 Theodore Marvel created patentable improvements to 
elevators and conveyors.100 Marvel contracted with Fanny Phillips who 
agreed to perform a number of tasks from advancing all funds for 
promoting the inventions to “do[ing] all things which a wise and 
energetic owner of said patents with ample financial ability ought to 
do.”101 Fanny Phillips died within seven months of the second patent’s 
issuance. The contract provided, “I [Fanny Phillips] agree and bind 
myself and my legal representatives as above, with and to Marvel and 
his legal representatives.”102 Marvel requested that Phillips’ executors 
continue to perform the contract, specifically to advance money to 
promote the inventions. The executors refused to take any actions other 
than tendering the patents to Marvel, and Marvel sued. The court 
found that the contract involved Phillips’ personal skill, attention, and 
ability, and therefore the contract became impossible to perform upon 
Phillips’ death.103 
Discussing the boilerplate language binding Phillips’ legal 
representatives, the court concluded that because Phillips was 
discharged from his obligations at death, his executors could not be  
96. In re Estate of Sauder, 156 P.3d at 1213; see also In re Estate of Sauder, 
No. 93,556, 2005 WL 2715678, at *2 (Kan. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2005) 
(discussing reliance on the no-assignment clause). 
97. In re Estate of Sauder, 156 P.3d at 1215; see also In re Estate of Sauder, 
2005 WL 2715678, at *2. 
98. In re Estate of Sauder, 156 P.3d at 1215 (citing Ames v. Sayler, 642 
N.E.2d 1340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)). 
99. 38 N.E. 1117 (Mass. 1894). 
100. Id. at 1117–18. 
101. Id. at 1118.  
102. Id. (emphasis added). 
103. Id. (finding that Phillips’ duties were subject to an implied condition that 
he “be alive and well enough in health to perform [the duties]”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019 
Contracts of the Dead and Boilerplate 
619 
bound. The court asserted this was an appropriate manipulation of the 
contract language for three reasons. First, it would prevent the estate 
from being “exposed to hazards for an indefinite time.”104 Second, it 
would allow Phillips to appoint an executor of his choosing without 
considering the executor’s ability to perform the remaining contract 
duties. Third, it would protect Marvel from the risks that Phillips would 
appoint “an unsuitable executor.”105 Perhaps anticipating arguments 
that the court’s approach would prevent parties from making contracts 
binding on a decedent’s estate, the court stated that “[i]t would require 
explicit words to show that parties entering into a contract like this 
intended that executors should perform the duties undertaken by 
Phillips.”106 
In Browne v. Fairhall,107 the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
extended this approach to a fact pattern involving negligible skill, 
talent, or effort. John B. Browne contracted to purchase the stocks and 
bonds of a particular corporation from Fairhall for $1,375,000 in cash 
and $200,000 in unsecured promissory notes.108 Browne was to deliver 
the cash and promissory notes to an escrow agent within ninety days. 
The contract provided that it shall be “binding upon and inure to the 
benefit of the respective heirs, executors, and administrators.”109 Under 
the agreement, Browne had discretion to designate when, within a 
three-year period, the $200,000 promissory note would be payable.110 
Browne died approximately fifty days after making the contract. At the 
time of his death, Browne had not delivered the promissory notes or 
otherwise designated when the $200,000 would be payable.111 
The court said the agreement was a personal services contract 
because only Browne could set the maturity date (within the three-year 
period) for the $200,000 promissory note.112 Death made performance 
impossible, so the contract terminated and Browne’s estate was not 
obligated to purchase the stocks or bonds.113 In contrast, many 




106. Id. (emphasis added) (noting that “[e]ven in the case of a partnership, a 
provision for continuing a partner’s interest after his death must be clear 
and unambiguous”). 
107. 100 N.E. 556 (Mass. 1913).  
108. Id. at 556. Browne also agreed to transfer certain Chicago real estate. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. Any unpaid balance would bear interest at six percent per annum. Id. 
111. Id. at 557. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
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estate is not a personal service.114 In response to the argument that the 
court’s interpretation made the contract language about binding heirs, 
executors, and administrators meaningless, the court proclaimed that if 
Browne specified the maturity date (or dates) and delivered the 
promissory note before his death, the contract would no longer have 
been a personal services contract. In that case, if Browne had 
subsequently died before paying the $200,000, his estate would have 
been obligated.115 A leading contracts commentator endorses the 
approach in Browne based on intent: “Even if a contract binds not only 
the promisor but all legal representatives, successors, and assigns, those 
successors will not be required to specifically perform the promise unless 
that is the parties’ clear intention.”116 
Marvel and Browne appear to create a doctrinal path both for 
sidestepping any boilerplate about successors or assigns and for the 
contract being binding on legal representatives, heirs, or executors. If 
the contract terminates with the party’s death so that there is nothing 
to succeed to, to be the assignee of, or to be bound by, then the 
boilerplate simply does not apply to death.117 
 
114. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
115. Browne, 100 N.E. at 557–58. 
116. Williston on Contracts, supra note 30, § 77:75, at 504 (emphasis 
added). 
117. Arguably, both cases also are unusual in that the court refused to 
bifurcate the transactions. See Marvel v. Phillips, 38 N.E. 1117, 1118 
(Mass. 1894). (“The different parts of the agreement are not separable.”); 
Browne, 100 N.E. at 557 (“Performance of the whole agreement became 
impossible because it had become impossible to carry out one of its 
essential terms by giving the promissory notes of the testator such as had 
been contracted for.”) (emphasis added). For example, in Marvel, the 
court could have found that the duty to pay or advance money was not a 
personal service and survived death, but the obligations to promote and 
manage the inventions were personal services and terminated at Phillips’ 
death. Marvel, 38 N.E. at 1118 (“[Phillips’] chief undertakings were 
personal in their character. He was to endeavor to create a profitable 
business under the patents, and to manage it . . . .”). Similarly, the court 
in Browne could have held that the obligation to set the maturity date 
for the $200,000 promissory note was personal, but the obligation to 
transfer the remaining $1,375,000 in cash within ninety days was not. 
Other courts have been willing to bifurcate. See, e.g., Mullen v. Wafer, 
480 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Ark. 1972) (concluding that the obligation to sell 
the assets of an accounting practice survived the seller’s death, but the 
seller’s obligation to assist with the transition of the practice to the buyer 
terminated with the seller’s death, and stating that “the contract is 
severable and can be apportioned”); Brearton v. DeWitt, 170 N.E. 119 
(N.Y. 1930) (holding that an obligation to pay money survived, but the 
medical practitioner’s obligation to provide or supervise medical care 
terminated with his death). 
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The Illinois Supreme Court discussed binding-type boilerplate at 
length in Vogel v. Melish and chose not to apply it at death.118 Vogel 
and Koster were the two equal dominant shareholders of a 
corporation,119 and they entered into a shareholders agreement creating 
a “right of first refusal”120 in the event “either party desired to sell, 
transfer, assign, convey or otherwise dispose of all or part of his 
shares.”121 Koster died, and Vogel asked the court whether he had an 
option to buy the decedent’s shares in connection with the 
“testamentary transfer”122 and when the agreement would terminate. 
First, the court concluded that “[t]he occurrences giving rise to the 
option to purchase are inter vivos transfers” and “there is no express 
restriction on intestate or testamentary disposition.”123 Perhaps this 
conclusion was appropriate because the agreement described the right 
of first refusal triggering event as when a party “desired to . . . dispose 
of all or part of his shares”124—presumably Koster did not desire to die 
and thereby dispose of his shares. 
Second, in regards to the timing of the agreement’s termination, 
the court quoted the concluding paragraph of the shareholders 
agreement, which stated: “[T]he provisions of this agreement shall be 
binding upon and inuring to the benefit of the parties hereto and their 
respective administrators, executors, heirs and personal 
representatives.”125 The appellate court affirmed the trial court on the 
grounds that “the stockholder’s agreement was personal to the parties 
and terminated with the death of Koster,” and the boilerplate provision 
about the agreement being binding on heirs and executors applied “only 
if either of the parties during the lifetimes of both contracted to 
purchase shares pursuant to the stockholder’s agreement.”126 The 
appellate court emphasized that “neither party was required to accept 
performance by strangers to the agreement.”127 The Illinois Supreme 
Court also affirmed stating: “In view of the detail of the stockholder’s 
 
118. Vogel. v. Melish, 203 N.E.2d 411 (Ill. 1965). Vogel was a patent attorney, 
and Koster was an inventor. They each owned 40 percent of the stock of 
Vogel Tool & Die Company. 
119. Id. at 412. Vogel was a patent attorney and drafted the shareholders 
agreement. Id. 
120. Id. at 413. 
121. Id. at 412. 
122. Id. Koster’s widow “subsequently sought to have some of the shares 
transferred to her in satisfaction of her widow’s award.” Id. 
123. Id. at 413. 
124. Id. at 412 (emphasis added). 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 413. 
127. Id. 
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agreement, it is unreasonable to assume that the parties intended it to 
survive the death of either of them . . . when no provision for that 
contingency is made . . . other than the vague and general terms” of 
the boilerplate provision binding the administrators, executors, heirs, 
and personal representatives.128 
In sharp contrast, some courts have applied binding-type 
boilerplate to conclude the contract survived death. In United States ex 
rel. Wilhelm v. Chain,129 the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether 
obligations to guarantee the debt of a bank survived the death of the 
guarantor. James W. Flynn and other individuals guaranteed the debt 
of a bank that became insolvent, closed its doors, and refused to pay 
depositors. Upon Flynn’s death, Nellie Flynn Chain became the 
executrix of his estate.130 Flynn had never revoked or terminated his 
suretyship during his lifetime. The issue was brought to the courts when 
a trustee, Wilhelm, brought an action against the bank for $3,190.72 
that was deposited in the bank when it closed.131 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded the guarantee was 
merely an offer which terminated with Flynn’s death.132 But on appeal, 
the U.S. Supreme Court concluded the guarantee was a contract 
supported by consideration133 and reversed on two grounds. First, the 
court relied on the presumption that contracts survive unless personal 
skill is required.134 Second, the Court enforced the contract boilerplate 
that the obligors “bind not only themselves, but also their executors, 
administrators, and successors” because the clause was “in full accord 
with the presumption.”135 
In Warner v. Kaplan, New York courts not only applied and 
enforced a boilerplate clause but indicated that it represented the 
parties’ intent without any evidence other than the written contract.136 
Glen Altman agreed to purchase a cooperative apartment on Park 
Avenue in Manhattan from the Kaplans for $2.3 million in cash, and 
she paid $230,000 as a deposit in escrow when signing the contract. 
Before closing on the apartment or moving in with her two dogs, Ms. 
Altman died unexpectedly from a stroke.137 Her estate notified the  
128. Id. 
129. 300 U.S. 31 (1937).  
130. Id. at 32.  
131. Id. at 32–33.  
132. Chain v. Wilhelm, 84 F.2d 138, 140 (4th Cir. 1936). 
133. Wilhelm, 300 U.S. at 34. 
134. Id. at 35. 
135. Id. 
136. Warner v. Kaplan, 892 N.Y.S.2d 311 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), aff’g 867 
N.Y.S.2d 660 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
137. Warner, 867 N.Y.S.2d at 661, 665. 
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Kaplans that it would not be purchasing the co-op apartment, 
demanded the return of the $230,000 deposit, and sued when the 
Kaplans directed the escrow agent to keep the $230,000. The estate 
pointed out that the contract specified only Ms. Altman as the tenant, 
and the co-op board of directors had to approve any new tenant. As a 
result, the estate argued the contract became impossible to perform 
once Ms. Altman died.138 
The court rejected the estate’s argument. According to the court, 
the “crux of this matter”139 was Section 15.2 of the contract which 
stated that “[this contract] shall bind and inure to the benefit of the 
[p]arties hereto and their respective heirs, personal and legal 
representatives and successors in interest.”140 Although the court 
mentioned no evidence that Ms. Altman and the Kaplans read, 
discussed, or negotiated this provision or Ms. Altman’s possible death 
before closing, the court stated: “[T]his provision indicates that [they] 
explicitly contemplated . . . the possibility of either party’s death before 
closing, by specifying that the death would not terminate the contract, 
but that the contract would survive, to be performed by the successor 
or heirs of the deceased party.”141 As justification, the court stated that 
the boilerplate “would be meaningless if it did not bind the purchaser’s 
estate to her contractual obligation . . . and ‘a contract should not be 
interpreted so as to render any clause meaningless.’”142 In addition, the 
court embraced the clause as boilerplate: “That this provision is a 
standard clause in a form contract renders it no less enforceable; the 
clause is clear and unambiguous, and if it inaccurately reflected the 
parties’ intentions, it could have been rewritten.”143 
In Stein v. Bruce,144 a Missouri court stated that a boilerplate 
“binding-on-executors” clause “clearly” revealed the parties’ intent.145 
Stein agreed to purchase real estate for $19,000. A week before the 
closing, Stein died, and the administrator of his estate argued the 
contract terminated and sued to recover deposits of $2,900.146 The court 
concluded that the contract did not terminate and Stein’s estate could 
not recover the deposits for three reasons. First, the contract did not 
 
138. Warner, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 314. The estate also argued that her death made 
the contract unenforceable because of “frustration of contract purpose.” 
Id. at 314–15. 
139. Id. at 313. 
140. Warner, 867 N.Y.S.2d at 665. 
141. Warner, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 313 (emphasis added). 
142. Id. at 314. 
143. Id. 
144. 366 S.W.2d 732 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963). 
145. Id. at 734. 
146. Id. at 733–34. 
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require Stein to perform any actions of a personal nature, and under 
the general presumption the contact survived.147 Second, the court 
stated:  
[T]he contract clause reading, “This [boilerplate clause] is to 
extend to and be binding upon the heirs, executors, 
administrators and assigns of the parties hereto,” clearly reveals 
that the parties intended, in the eventuality of either’s death, that 
the agreement would be performed . . . by one (or more) of the 
persons named.148  
Third, the liquidated damages clause providing that Stein would forfeit 
the deposits if he failed to close was not unenforceable as a penalty 
because the seller paid a substantial commission to a real estate agent 
in connection with arranging the sale to Stein.149 
Ames v. Sayler involved an oral sharecropping agreement.150 After 
the farmer’s death, his family argued the contract survived, so they 
could continue to farm the land in exchange for the rent.151 The court 
rejected the family’s arguments but in dictum commented that the 
result would have been different if the sharecropper had used a standard 
form contract including a boilerplate clause that “the terms of the lease 
shall be binding on the heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of 
both lessee and lessor in like manner as upon the original parties.”152 
The Kansas Supreme Court in Sauder cited Ames with approval in 
connection with concluding that “[w]hen parties to a sharecrop farm 
lease agree that the terms of the contract ‘shall apply to and be binding 
upon the heirs, successors, executors, and administrators of the parties,’ 
they express an intent that the contract is not a personal services 
contract [and survives death].”153 
 
147. Id. at 734; see infra notes 212–221 and accompanying text (regarding the 
general rule that a contract survives death). 
148. Stein, 366 S.W.2d at 734–35 (emphasis added). 
149. Id. at 736–37 (noting also that the sellers “were burdened by the contract 
for almost four months”). Presumably this demonstrated that the amount 
of the liquidated damages was reasonably related to the innocent party’s 
actual damages. 
150. Ames v. Sayler, 642 N.E.2d 1340, 1341 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
151. Id. at 1341–42.  
152. Id. at 1344 (discussing a University of Illinois College of Agriculture form). 
153. In re Estate of Sauder, 156 P.3d 1204, 1215 (Kan. 2007); see supra notes 
94–98 and accompanying text (discussing the Sauder case in more detail). 
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V. Options Available when Interpreting Boilerplate 
at Death 
The process of interpreting words in a contract involves a 
fundamental tension at the core of contract law. On the one hand, a 
dominant goal of contract law is to carry out the intent of the parties.154 
On the other hand, many courts and commentators stress the “objective 
test of assent.”155 Judge Learned Hand expressed an extreme objective 
view with his assertion that “[a] contract has, strictly speaking, nothing 
to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties.”156 This 
tension between the subjective and the objective ripples through the 
cases, and courts and commentators sometimes emphasize one aspect 
of contract interpretation over another.157 
The Restatement of Contracts provides rules to accommodate both 
approaches. The Restatement begins its interpretation rules with a 
focus on the subjective intent of the parties.158 If both parties attach 
the same subjective meaning to a word, it is interpreted according to 
that meaning even if it is nonsensical.159 In explaining this rule, the 
Seventh Circuit stated: “Parties, like Humpty Dumpty, may use words 
as they please. If they wish the symbols ‘one Caterpillar D9G tractor’ 
to mean ‘500 railroad cars full of watermelons,’ that’s fine—provided 
the parties share this weird meaning.”160 A related Restatement rule 
provides that if one party (the innocent party) attaches a particular 
meaning to a word and the other party knows or has reason to know 
the innocent party has attached that meaning, the word will have the 
meaning understood by the innocent party.161 Some leading 
commentators state that “modern contract law has . . . adopt[ed]” this 
approach,162 and this approach has “generally been approved by the 
courts.”163 But another noted commentator says the courts merely pay 
“lip service”164 to these Restatement subjective intent rules, we should 
not “be fooled by language in numerous judicial decisions that refers to 
 
154. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
155. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Principles of Contract Law 46 (3d 
ed. 2014). 
156. Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). 
157. Corbin on Contracts, supra note 35, § 24.6, at 25–28. 
158. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 200 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
159. See id. § 201(1). 
160. TKO Equip. Co. v. C & G Coal Co., 863 F.2d 541, 545 (7th Cir. 1988). 
161. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201(2)(b) (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
162. Knapp et al., supra note 13, at 383. 
163. Id. at 388. 
164. Hillman, supra note 155, at 280. 
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the parties’ intentions,”165 and courts typically use an objective 
approach instead. 
After the rules focused on intent, the Restatement follows with a 
series of general rules that can allow courts to interpret contract 
language more objectively. In particular, Restatement § 202(3) 
provides: “Unless a different intention is manifested, where language 
has a generally prevailing meaning, it is interpreted in accordance with 
that meaning.”166 A related comment states: “Words are read as having 
the meaning given them by general usage.”167 Under the objective 
approach, “[c]ourts generally determine the meaning of language by 
ascertaining what a reasonable person would believe the language 
means, not what either of the parties actually thought the language 
meant.”168 Courts often refer to this as the “plain meaning rule.”169 
When the issue is post-death survival of a contract, admissible, 
outcome-determinative evidence of the parties’ intent beyond the 
written terms of the contract likely will be nonexistent. An opposing 
party’s attempt to introduce testimony about the decedent’s oral 
statements indicating intent typically will need to qualify for an 
exception under a dead-man’s statute of evidence.170 Furthermore, any 
such testimony that would be admissible likely would be greeted with 
great skepticism consistent with the adage that such testimony should 
 
165. Id. 
166. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(3)(a) (Am. Law Inst. 
1981) (emphasis added). 
167. Id. § 202 cmt. E. The comment includes some qualifications to the 
prevailing meaning rule: “This rule is a rule of interpretation in the 
absence of contrary evidence, not a rule excluding contrary evidence. It 
may also yield to internal indications such as inconsistency, absurdity, or 
departure from normal grammar, punctuation, or word order.” Id. 
168. Hillman, supra note 155, at 279; see also All-Ways Logistics, Inc. v. USA 
Truck, Inc., 583 F.3d 511, 516 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Coleman v. Regions 
Bank, 216 S.W.3d 569, 574 (2005)) (“[W]e give words their ‘ordinary 
meaning’ viewing the subject of the contract ‘as the mass of mankind 
would view it.’”).  
169. See, e.g., Corbin on Contracts, supra note 35, § 24.7, at 34 (“[T]he 
‘plain meaning’ rule is adhered to by a majority of the jurisdictions in the 
United States.”). 
170. See 81 Am. Jur. 2D Witnesses § 553, at 541 (2015) (“A dead-mans’ 
statute embraces verbal transactions and statements, and thus, testimony 
as to the existence of an oral agreement is inadmissible absent written 
evidence to substantiate the alleged agreement.”) (citations omitted); see 
also id. § 616, at 590 (discussing an exception when the personal 
representative voluntarily testifies on an issue raised by a party adversely 
interested that concerns an oral communication of the decedent). 
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be given little weight.171 Thus, the written language of the contract may 
be the only evidence available to determine the parties’ intent for 
contracts of the dead. 
In addition to the plain (or prevailing) meaning rule, there are other 
general contract interpretation maxims that might be relevant in 
particular situations. For example, “an interpretation which gives 
[an] . . . effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an 
interpretation which leaves a part . . . [having] no effect.”172 Although 
a related comment stresses that to fit the context “words . . . may be 
disregarded.”173 Another potentially relevant maxim is––“[I]f the 
principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great 
weight,”174 although “if the purposes of the parties are obscure, the court 
may well fall back upon ‘plain meaning.’”175 The Restatement also 
stresses the importance of context: “A writing is interpreted as a 
whole.”176 
A. Plain or Prevailing Meaning of Some Boilerplate Terms 
Relevant boilerplate often includes the words “assigns,” 
“successors,” and “binding upon heirs and executors.” In the absence of 
evidence about the parties’ intent, a court may consider the plain (or 
prevailing) meaning of the written words. Without considering the 
parties’ probable intent and the relevant policy considerations, it could 
be forcefully argued that the word “successor” and the phrase “binding 
on heirs and executors” indicate that a contract should survive death, 
and it is less clear with the word “assigns.” 
Successor. The word “successor” is flexible and its boundaries 
indefinite.177 “[I]t is a word with many legal applications and . . . is 
 
171. See, e.g., Marks v. St. Landy Parish, 308 So.2d 819, 824 (La. Ct. App. 
1975) (treating oral statements of the dead as “the weakest kind of 
evidence . . . entitled to little weight”). 
172. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(a) (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
173. Id. at § 202 cmt. d. 
174. Id. at § 202(1). 
175. Knapp et al., supra note 13, at 391 (emphasis added) (quoting Edwin 
W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 
Colum. L. Rev. 833, 853–55 (1964)). 
176. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(2) (Am. Law Inst. 
1981). A related comment stresses the importance of context. Id. at § 202 
cmt. b (“The meaning of words and other symbols commonly depends on 
their context.”). 
177. Dille v. Plainview Coal Co., 250 N.W. 607, 613 (Iowa 1933) (referring to 
“successor” as a “plastic word”); Proctor v. Foxmeyer Drug, Co., 884 
S.W.2d 853, 861 (Tex. App. 1994) (“The exact meaning of the word 
‘successor’ when used in a contract depends largely on the kind and 
character of the contract, its purpose and circumstances, and the 
context.”). 
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therefore difficult to define precisely . . . . Mr. Justice Marshall once 
remarked, ‘There is, and can be no single definition of “successor” which 
is applicable in every legal context.’”178 Nevertheless, it appears to 
comfortably encompass the relationship between a decedent and his or 
her estate. One court has stated: “[I]n modern application the term has 
a broader significance than successor in respect of the estate of a 
deceased, yet it is an apt and appropriate term to designate one to 
whom property descends.”179 Its dictionary definition includes “a person 
who succeeds to a throne, title or estate.”180 Succession’s general legal 
definition includes, “the devolution of title to property under the law[s] 
of descent and distribution,”181 and it “frequently possesses the 
somewhat broader meaning of the acquisition of rights upon the death 
of another.”182 
The Uniform Probate Code employs the term “successors”183 and 
defines it as any “persons, other than creditors, who are entitled to 
property of a decedent under his [or her] will or this [Code].”184 A leading 
treatise on the law of estates, in beginning its discussion of the law of 
wills, uses the word “succession” four times in the first two pages.185 In 
Howell v. Murray Mortgage Co., Frederick Howell borrowed money 
from a mortgage company and purchased real estate.186 Howell granted 
the lender a deed of trust, which included a due-on-sale clause. Howell 
died, and the administrator of his estate sought a declaratory judgment 
canceling the due-on-sale clause.187 The deed of trust specifically stated 
 
178. Safer v. Perper, 569 F.2d 87, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting Howard 
Johnson Co. v. Hotel Emps., 417 U.S. 249, 263 (1974)). 
179. Dille, 250 N.W. at 613. 
180. Successor, Webster’s Third International Dictionary 2282 (1981) 
(emphasis added). 
181. Succession, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). 
182. Id. (5th ed. 1979) (citing In re Russell’s Estate, 17 Cal. App. 3d 758, 769 
(Cal App. 1971)). 
183. Unif. Prob. Code § 1-201, 8 U.L.A. 49 (Supp. 2012); see also id. § 2-
701 (describing “[c]ontracts [c]oncerning [s]uccession” as “contract[s] to 
make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or to die intestate 
. . .”). 
184. Id. § 1-201. 
185. Schoenblum, supra note 14, § 1.1, at 1–2. 
186. Howell v. Murray Mortg. Co., 890 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tex. App. 1994). 
187. The due-on-sale clause basically provided that if borrower sold or 
transferred any part of the property without the lender’s consent, the 
unpaid balance of the loan would be immediately due and payable. Id. at 
80–81. For these purposes, a “transfer” did not include “a transfer by 
devise, descent, or by operation of law upon . . . death.” Id. at 81. 
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it “shall bind . . . the . . . successors and assigns of . . . [b]orrower.”188 
The court said: 
Broadly speaking, when the term successor is used in common 
parlance it means anyone who follows. However, when used as a 
legal term applying to . . . natural persons, it is an apt and 
appropriate term to designate one to whom property descends or 
the estate of [a] decedent.189  
Thus, without considering the intentions of the parties and relevant 
policy considerations in connection with contracts of the dead, an estate 
generally could be described as a decedent’s “successor.” 
Assigns. Thorough drafters likely use the familiar phrase 
“successors and assigns,”190 but sometimes the word “assigns” stands 
alone and requires interpretation.191 When contract boilerplate states 
the contract is between the parties and their “assigns,” two significant 
interpretive problems arise with asserting that the estate (or heir) is an 
assign and therefore must perform the decedent’s remaining contractual 
obligations. 
The first problem or issue is that an “assignment” typically refers 
to a transfer of a right or property interest192 rather than the assumption 
of a duty. The dictionary defines “assignee” as “one to whom a right of 
property is legally transferred.”193 The general legal definition of an 
“assignment” is “[a] transfer or making over to another of the whole of 
any property, real or personal, in possession or in action, or of any 
estate or right therein. It includes transfers of all kinds of property.”194 
An assignment is frequently distinguished from the delegation of a duty. 
“Duties and liabilities under a contract . . . are not assigned, they are 
delegated, a concept distinct from assignment.”195 Thus, an assignee 
generally could enforce rights under a contract, but in the absence of 
 
188. Id. at 83–84 (quoting Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 
328 S.W.2d 778, 781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); and also quoting Farm & 
Home Sav. Ass’n v. Strauss, 671 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex. App. 1984)). 
189. Id. at 84 (internal brackets omitted). 
190. See id. (declining to interpret the word “assign” because the court’s 
analysis of the word “successor” resolved the issue). 
191. See, e.g., Smith v. Zuckman, 282 N.W. 269, 271 (1938). 
192. See Ex parte Cox, 828 So.2d 295, 299 (Ala. 2002); Tina L. Stark, 
Negotiating and Drafting Contract Boilerplate 81 (2003). 
193. Assignee, Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary (1981) (emphasis 
added). 
194. Assignment, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). 
195. Midland Mut. Life Ins. v. Mercy Clinics, 579 N.W.2d 823, 833 (Iowa 1998) 
(quoting E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 11.1, 
at 58–59) (“An obligor’s empowering of another to perform the obligor’s 
duty is known as a delegation of the performance of that duty.”). 
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other considerations, the other party could not be forced to accept 
performance from an assignee. One court has indicated there is no 
“assignment” when an estate assumes the decedent’s rights and 
obligations.196 
The second problem or issue is whether an estate is an “assignee” 
of the decedent. “In common acceptance the word [assignee] is limited 
to an ‘assignee in fact’” which is “one to whom an assignment has been 
made in fact by the party having the right.”197 Unlike an “assignee in 
fact,” an executor or administrator is an “assignee at law”198 and 
therefore generally would not be an “assign’ or “assignee.” In a case 
involving the dead-man’s statute of evidence, a court concluded that a 
residuary legatee was not an assignee because neither a general nor a 
residuary legacy “direct[s] the delivery of any particular property.”199 
Nevertheless, various authorities suggest that, depending on the 
context and other considerations, courts could define “assigns” or 
“assignment” differently. The Restatement asserts that “an assignment 
of ‘the contract’ or of ‘all my rights under the contract’ or an 
assignment in similar general terms is an assignment of the assignor’s 
rights and a delegation of his unperformed duties under the contract.”200 
Apparently, the theory is that “[o]ften parties do not ‘distinguish 
between these words of art.’”201 
Also, an assignee at law (such as an executor or administrator) 
could be considered an assignee under an expansive definition. A court 
has stated that if the context so requires, the word “assignee” can be 
considered in “its more comprehensive sense as including an assignee in 
law.”202 Another court has stated that the word “assignee” can include 
 
196. See In re Estate of Sauder, 156 P.3d 1204, 1215 (Kan. 2007) (describing 
the lower court’s conclusion as: “[T]he circumstances surrounding an 
administrator assuming the duties and obligations of a decedent under a 
contract is not as assignment”). The Kansas Court of Appeals in Sauder 
stated: “To direct that a written instrument becomes binding on a 
person’s heirs and administrators neither contemplates nor requires an 
assignment . . . . It is well established that upon death, the personal 
representative assumes the rights and obligations of the decedent by 
operation of law; no formal assignment is required.” In re Estate of 
Sauder, No. 93,556, 2005 WL 34455786, at *2 (Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 
2005). 
197. Mich. Tr. Co. v. Chaffee, 44 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.N.D. 1941). 
198. Id. (including a trustee in bankruptcy and a guardian). 
199. Johnson v. Bogdis, 67 S.E.2d 189, 191 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951) (concluding 
there was not a transfer, and therefore there was no assignment). The 
court also stated an heir is not an assignee. Id. at 192. 
200. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 328(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1981) 
(emphasis added). 
201. Midland Mut. Life Ins. v. Mercy Clinics, 579 N.W.2d 823, 833 (Iowa 1998). 
202. Mich. Tr. Co., 44 F. Supp. at 848, 850. 
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those who acquire “whether by conveyance, devise, descent, or act of 
law.”203 Thus, while boilerplate referring to a contract party and his or 
her assigns, in isolation, generally should not delegate duties at death, 
context, policy considerations, and some authorities could support the 
contrary result. 
Binding on Heirs and Executors. A standard boilerplate clause in 
contracts provides that “[t]his contract shall be binding on the parties 
and their heirs and executors.”204 The dictionary definition of “binding” 
is “imposing an obligation, duty or responsibility.”205 Thus, if the parties 
agree that “the contract” shall be binding upon each party’s heirs and 
executors, the plain meaning of the words suggests that the heirs and 
executors would be required to fulfill the decedent’s remaining duties. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that if the parties really intended 
to delegate post-death performance, presumably they would have used 
the words “delegate” and “estate.” 
The primary definition of “heir” is a person entitled to receive a 
decedent’s property in intestacy,206 which would exclude a beneficiary 
who takes under a will or a probate-avoidance arrangement. A 
secondary definition of “heir,” however, can include both a person who 
takes by will and a person who takes by intestacy.207 In popular usage, 
the word “heir” can refer simply to issue, children, or descendants.208 
An “executor” is a “person named by a testator to carry out the 
provisions in the testator’s will,”209 and the word “executor” technically 
does not include the administrator of an intestate estate.210 If the 
contract parties wanted to address contract survival whether or not the 
decedent had a will, the preferred term would be “personal 
representative.”211 Thus, for parties who really wanted to delegate 
duties (and acquiesce to that delegation) at death, one might anticipate 
some modifications to the standard boilerplate. 
B. Questioning the Policies Behind the General Rule of Contract Survival 
In 1597, an English court established the method for deciding 
whether a contract survives the obligor’s death.212 Over 400 years later, 
 
203. Sylan Props Co. v. State Planning Office, 711 A.2d 138, 140 (Me. 1998). 
204. See, e.g., Biagi v. Biagi, 43 Cal. Rptr. 707, 711 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965). 
205. Binding, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1981). 
206. Heir, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
207. Id. 
208. See Cook v. Underwood, 228 N.W. 629, 631 (Iowa 1930). 
209. Executor, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2010). 
210. Id. 
211. Personal Representative, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
212. Hyde v. Dean and Canons of Windsor, 78 Eng. Rep. 798 (Q.B. 1597). 
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a leading contracts commentator indicated this method can lead to 
“commercial senselessness.”213 The foundational case from 
Shakespearean England provided in part: “[A] covenant lies against an 
executor in every case, although he be not named; unless it be such a 
covenant as is to be performed by the person of the testator, which they 
cannot perform.”214 
While greater embellishment might have helped comprehension, 
this pithy proclamation suggests the economic assumptions the court 
embraced in 1597. First, the general rule is contract survival, and 
contract termination at death is the exception. This reflects an 
assumption that collective welfare is enhanced when the decedent’s 
successor (estate, heir, or beneficiary) mimics the decedent and 
performs the remaining duties under the contract. In other words, if the 
parent “shuffle[s] off this mortal coil”215 and leaves work undone, it is 
economically efficient for the children to stop their occupations and try 
to perform the occupation of their parent. Second, it assumes that it is 
not economically efficient for the surviving party to choose a 
replacement. Third, this framework assumes that the only time a 
contractual obligation should terminate at death is when “the person of 
the testator” would perform, and the successors cannot perform the 
duty. Thus, apparently it was only economically efficient for the 
contract to terminate if three conditions were present—first, 
performance depended on the personal effort of the decedent; second, 
materials, equipment, or other forms of capital were insignificant in 
performing the contract; and third, the successors could not perform. 
As an example of how this approach has worked, in 1615, an English 
court concluded that when the decedent contracted to build a house 
and died before completion, the decedent’s family or other successors 
were obligated to become home builders and finish the job (or search 
for and hire a replacement).216 More recently, courts have held that 
successors were obligated to finish constructing a YMCA building,217 a 
sewer system,218 and an oil rig.219 A treatise states: “Promises to erect 
or renovate buildings are enforced after the promisor’s death, so long 
 
213. Joseph M. Perillo, Contracts 496 (7th ed. 2014). 
214. Hyde, 78 Eng. Rep. at 798 (emphasis added). 
215. William Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 3, sc. 1. 
216. Quick v. Ludborrow, 81 Eng. Rep. 25 (K.B. 1615); see also Marshall v. 
Broadhurst, 148 Eng. Rep. 1480 (C.E. 1831) (explaining that a contract 
survives if “a man builds half a house and dies”). 
217. Exchange Nat’l Bank of Atchison v. Betts’ Estate, 176 P. 660, 662 (Kan. 
1918). 
218. In re Stormer’s Estate, 123 A.2d 627, 628 (Pa. 1956). 
219. Mackay v. Clark Rig Bldg. Co., 42 P.2d 341 (D. Cal. 1935). 
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as no one contemplated the decedent’s personal work.”220 As a 
summary, a court in 1983 stated: “Few contracts are terminated by 
death in the absence of explicit provisions [in the contract] to the 
contrary.”221 
The economic assumptions used in England in 1597 to create these 
rules, however, seem out of date. Sixteenth and seventeenth century 
England primarily was an agrarian economy,222 with other occupations 
using an apprentice system.223 People often inherited their occupation.224 
Formal education, which can open doors to other careers, was not even 
compulsory for all children until 1880.225 For this sixteenth-century 
society with limited occupational and geographic mobility, perhaps a 
rule that successors must fulfill the decedent’s unfinished business made 
economic sense. In addition, limited communication may have hindered 
a surviving contract party’s ability to choose a competent replacement. 
Even if the decedent’s family was not in the same business as the 
decedent, perhaps they were qualified to choose a replacement. 
Times have changed. Children are more likely to choose where they 
want to live and how they want to make a living, rather than 
 
220. Williston on Contracts, supra note 30, § 77.72, at 496. 
221. Shutt v. Butner, 303 S.E.2d 399, 401 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); see also 
Horning v. Ladd, 321 P.2d 795, 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (“Contracts do 
not die with the contractor (with a few exceptions . . . ) unless they 
contain [a] provision to that effect.”). 
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automatically adopting their parents’ choices.226 Even if the parent was 
a sharecropper or a home builder, today it seems dubious to presume 
with any confidence that the child or other successor will be a qualified 
sharecropper or home builder.227 Furthermore, in the information age, 
the surviving contract party likely can choose a qualified replacement. 
The surviving contract party probably understands its needs and the 
status of the project more thoroughly than the decedent’s family. In 
this economic context, it often will be appropriate to terminate the 
contract and avoid “economic senselessness.”228 
C. Doctrines for Avoiding Economic Senselessness 
The reported cases provide multiple paths to avoid boilerplate 
which could be interpreted to require that the decedent’s family or other 
successor perform the decedent’s remaining contractual obligations. 
This avoidance would be especially appropriate when the family or 
other successor has no experience in the field, and the surviving contract 
party wants to choose the replacement. 
First, a court could adopt an ascribed-intent approach and conclude 
that the parties (or reasonable persons in the positon of the parties) 
intended the contractual obligations to terminate at death. A court 
employed this technique in Smith v. Zuckman when the parties 
contracted in the names of themselves and their “successors and 
assigns.”229 Upon Smith’s death, the court stated that the contract 
“involve[d] such a relation of personal confidence that it must have been 
intended”230 that the arrangement would terminate upon Smith’s death. 
Second, if a contract provides that it is binding on “assigns,” a court 
could conclude that there is no “assignment” at death as between a 
decedent and his or her estate or heirs, as in the Sauder case.231 Third, 
regardless of any boilerplate about successors, assigns, heirs, executors, 
or administrators, a court simply could assert that the contract 
terminated at death. Under this approach, the contractual duties are 
discharged because there are no remaining contractual obligations to 
succeed to, assign, or to become binding upon anyone. This approach 
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was demonstrated in Marvel v. Phillips,232 in which the decedent was 
obligated to exercise some skill and discretion performing the 
contract.233 And also in Browne v. Fairhall,234 in which the decedent’s 
obligations were routine—just paying approximately eighty-seven 
percent of the purchase price in cash by a certain date and choosing a 
maturity date within a three-year period for a promissory note 
representing approximately 13 percent of the purchase price.235 
Fourth, regardless of any general boilerplate, a court could assert 
that the failure to directly address the consequences of death in the 
contract demonstrates an intent to terminate the contract at death, as 
in Vogel v. Melish.236 In response to arguments that these methods 
render the boilerplate meaningless, the estate could assert that the 
boilerplate would have applied if, before death, the decedent either had 
taken certain actions or would have applied if a party breached the 
contract before death. The courts used the former approach in Browne 
v. Fairhall237 and Vogel v. Melish.238 
Conclusion 
Contracting parties seldom negotiate death, but the plain meaning 
of some extremely common boilerplate terms would indicate that a 
contract survives an obligor’s death. This Article argues that in many 
situations, forcing the decedent’s successors to perform the remaining 
contractual duties would be “economic senselessness.”239 In contrast to 
the economic conditions in 1597 when the general rule of contract 
survival arose,240 today the majority of the workforce is not involved in 
agriculture241 and occupations are seldom inherited. As a result of 
increased occupational and geographic mobility, requiring the 
decedent’s family or other successor to try to mimic the decedent 
typically will not be economically efficient. Many cases have dealt with 
these boilerplate provisions, and this Article describes methods to 
terminate a contract at death despite boilerplate language indicating 
the contrary. 
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